State v. Lemmons Appellant\u27s Brief Dckt. 43720 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
9-14-2016
State v. Lemmons Appellant's Brief Dckt. 43720
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"State v. Lemmons Appellant's Brief Dckt. 43720" (2016). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 6143.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/6143
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO















S.Ct. Nos. 43720 and 43721
(consolidated)
Twin Falls Co. CR-2011-14836
and CR-2012-10131
__________________________________
OPENING BRIEF OF APPELLANT
__________________________________
Appeal from the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District of the State of Idaho
In and For the County of Twin Falls
__________________________________
HONORABLE RANDY J. STOKER,
District Judge
__________________________________
Dennis Benjamin Lawrence Wasden
ISBA# 4199 ATTORNEY GENERAL
NEVIN, BENJAMIN McKAY STATE OF IDAHO
& BARTLETT LLP Kenneth K. Jorgensen
303 West Bannock Deputy Attorney General
P.O. Box 2772 Criminal Law Division
Boise, ID  83701 P.O. Box 83720
(208) 343-1000 Boise, ID 83720-0010
db@nbmlaw.com (208) 334-2400
Attorneys for Appellant Attorneys for Respondent
i 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
  
I. Table of Authorities  ........................................................................................... ii 
 
II. Statement of the Case  ........................................................................................ 1 
 
 A. Nature of the case .................................................................................... 1 
 
 B. Procedural History and Statement of Facts ............................................ 1 
  
III. Issues Presented on Appeal ................................................................................ 4 
 
IV. Argument ............................................................................................................. 4 
 
 A. The district court has the authority to run the fines in the 2011 case 
concurrent with one another and to the fines in the 2012 case. The 
court abused its discretion in not doing so .............................................. 4 
 
  1. Introduction ................................................................................... 4 
 
  2. Why relief should be granted ........................................................ 5 
 
V. Conclusion  ........................................................................................................ 7 
ii 
   TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  
 
STATE CASES  
 
Cummings v. Stephens, —Idaho —, —P.3d —, 2016 WL. 4734857 (2016) ............. 4, 6 
 
State v. Brandt, 110 Idaho 341, 715 P.2d 1011 (Ct. App. 1986) .................................. 5 
 
State v. Calley, 140 Idaho 663, 99 P.3d 616 (2004) ...................................................... 6 
 
State v. Clapper, 143 Idaho 338, 144 P.3d 43 (Ct. App. 2006) ..................................... 6 
 
State v. Jones, 440 P.2d 371 (Or. 1968) ........................................................................ 6 
 
State v. Lawrence, 98 Idaho 399, 565 P.2d 989 (1977), citing, State v. Crouch, 407 
P.2d 671 (N.M. 1965) .................................................................................. 4, 5, 6 
 
State v. Lemmons, 158 Idaho 971, 354 P.3d 1186 (2015) ..................................... 1, 2, 3 
 
State v. Monroe, 97 Idaho 457, 546 P.2d 854 (1976) .................................................... 4 
 
STATE STATUTES  
 
Idaho Code § 37-2732B .......................................................................................... 4, 5, 6 
 
Idaho Code § 73-116 ....................................................................................................... 5 
 
Idaho Code § 18-308 ............................................................................................... 3, 5, 6 
 
1
II.  STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the Case
This is an appeal from the sentences imposed after remand by the Supreme
Court.  State v. Lemmons, 158 Idaho 971, 354 P.3d 1186 (2015).  The district court
abused its discretion when denying the request that the $10,000 mandatory fine for
Count II in Case No. CR-2012-10131 run concurrently with the fine in Count I as
well as run concurrently to the two $10,000 mandatory fines imposed in Case No.
CR-2011-10131.
B. Procedural History and Statement of Facts
Bryann Kristine Lemmons was charged by information with two counts of
trafficking in methamphetamine in Case No. CR-2011-14836.  R (41278 and 41279)
123.  Count I alleged that she and Sara Beth Haffner delivered 28 grams or more of
methamphetamine to Confidential Informant 86 on October 25, 2011.  Count II also
alleged that she and Sara Beth Haffner delivered 28 grams or more of
methamphetamine to Confidential Informant 86, but this time on December 6,
2011.  Id. 
Later she was also charged with two counts of conspiracy to traffic in
methamphetamine in Case No. CR-2012-10131.  R (41278 and 41279) 619.  Count I
alleged that she and Sara Beth Haffner conspired on October 25, 2011, to deliver
the methamphetamine to Confidential Informant 86.  Count II alleged that she and
Sara Beth Haffner conspired on December 6, 2011, to deliver methamphetamine to
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Confidential Informant 86.  Id.
The two cases were consolidated for trial and she was found guilty of all four
counts.  R (41278 and 41279) 380-381.  The court, however, granted Ms. Lemmons’
motion for a new trial on portions of the two Trafficking charges and on the entirety
of the two Conspiracy charges.  R (41278 and 41279) 452.  The State filed a Notice
of Appeal.  R (41278 and 41279) 464.  The district court then granted Ms. Lemmons’
Motion for Reconsideration in part by granting a Judgment of Acquittal on the
conspiracy counts.  R (41278 and 41279) 533.  Ms. Lemmons filed a Notice of Cross-
Appeal.  R (41278 and 41279) 538.  The Supreme Court reversed both the Judgment
of Acquittals and the partial grant of the new trial motion, affirmed the convictions,
and remanded for sentencing. State v. Lemmons, 158 Idaho 971, 977, 354 P.3d 1186,
1192 (2015).
At the sentencing hearing, the State asked the court “to impose a sentence of
five years fixed plus seven years indeterminate for a total of 12 years to serve on
each count concurrently to one other. We recognize there is a statutory fine in these
cases. We are not asking for anything other than what’s required by law.”
T (Sentencing), p. 13, ln. 8-13.  The court then asked if it was the State’s position
that it must impose a $10,000 fine per case.  The State responded, “That is the way
I understand the law, Your Honor.”  Id., ln. 19-22.
Ms. Lemmons argued that both the terms of incarceration and the fines be
run concurrently.  She argued:
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We understand the seriousness of these crimes as enunciated by the
legislature in imposing the mandatory minimum. We submit to the
Court, Your Honor, that just because there are mandatory minimums,
that that does not mean the Court is deprived of the authority to run
these sentences concurrent as well as the fines running concurrent.
Id., p. 14, ln. 6-12.
The court stated that it believed it was required to impose separate fines and
those fines could not be run concurrently.
We have a very specific statute in Idaho, which is Idaho Code Section
18-308, which allows for successive or consecutive sentences. I think
the rule of thumb is that sentences are deemed concurrent by default
unless the Court specifically makes them consecutive. That applies to a
prison sentence. I can find nothing in the state of Idaho, by statute or
case law either, that deals with the issue of -- we have in this case of
mandatory fines; therefore, it is my conclusion that I am required, Ms.
Lemmons, to impose the mandatory fines in all of these cases in this
case.
Id., p. 20, ln. 11-21.  It then imposed four concurrent fifteen-year terms of
imprisonment with three years fixed.  Id., p. 23, ln. 9-18.  The court declined to run
the fines concurrently, stating as follows:
I do not see that I have any discretion to impose other than a $10,000
fine on each count, and I understand there’s an argument there, but
when the legislature created mandatory sentences in Idaho and
specified a minimum fine, I think that that’s exactly what it means,
and all these counts stand on their own. I have the authority to run
concurrent sentences in terms of the underlying penitentiary sentence,
but I don’t think I do with regard to fines. If I’m wrong, supreme
court’s going to tell me, and that will be another appeal.  So you have a
total of $40,000 of financial obligations owing in this case.
Id., p. 23, ln. 19 - p. 24, ln. 4.  The court’s written judgments imposed $40,000 in
fines.  R 35-36; 86-87.
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Timely notices of appeal were filed.  R 39; 90.  The Supreme Court
consolidated the two appeals for all purposes.  R 55. 
III.  ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
Does the district court have the discretionary authority to run mandatory
$10,000 fines under I.C. § 37-2732B(3) concurrently?  If so, did the court here abuse
its discretion in declining to do so? 
IV.  ARGUMENT
A. The district court has the authority to run the fines in the 2011 case
concurrent with one another and to the fines in the 2012 case.  The
court abused its discretion in not doing so. 
1.  Introduction
The decision whether to run multiple sentences concurrently or consecutively
is one of discretion.  See, State v. Monroe, 97 Idaho 457, 457, 546 P.2d 854, 854
(1976) (Imposition of three consecutive fourteen-year sentences was unduly harsh
and an abuse of discretion.); State v. Lawrence, 98 Idaho 399, 401, 565 P.2d 989, 991
(1977) (Decision to impose consecutive sentences under I.C. § 18-308 discretionary). 
A discretionary decision will be upheld on appeal only if it appears that the trial
court (1) correctly perceived the issue as discretionary, (2) acted within the
boundaries of its discretion and consistent with the applicable legal standards, and
(3) reached its determination through an exercise of reason.  Cummings v. Stephens,
— Idaho —, — P.3d —, 2016 WL 4734857, at *2 (2016).  Here, the court did not
recognize it possessed the authority to run the fines all concurrently with one
another and thus that portion of the sentence should be vacated and the matter
  Idaho Code § 73-116 provides that “[t]he common law of England, so far as1
it is not repugnant to, or inconsistent with, the constitution or laws of the United
States, in all cases not provided for in these compiled laws, is the rule of decision in
all courts of this state.”
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remanded for resentencing.
2.  Why relief should be granted
Idaho Code § 37-2732B(a)(3) states that an offender “shall be . . . fined not
less than ten thousand dollars ($10,000).”  Idaho Code § 37-2732B(a)(8) provides
that “imposition or execution of sentence shall not be suspended, deferred, or
withheld.”  Notwithstanding the prohibition on suspended, deferred and withheld
sentences, multiple mandatory terms of imprisonment may be run concurrently
under I.C. § 18-308.  See, State v. Brandt, 110 Idaho 341, 345, 715 P.2d 1011, 1015
(Ct. App. 1986).  While I.C. § 18-308 permits concurrent terms of imprisonment,
there is no statutory authority expressly permitting concurrent fines, particularly
mandatory fines.  This is where the district court stopped its analysis and concluded
it did not have the authority to impose concurrent fines.  However, it erred because
courts have common law authority to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences (a
broader authority than the concurrent terms of imprisonment authorized by I.C. §
18-308) which has not been abrogated by statute.
As stated by our Supreme Court, “[a]t common law the courts had
discretionary power to impose a consecutive sentence and permissive legislation was
not necessary. . . . In Idaho the common law is the rule of decision in cases not
otherwise provided for by statute. I.C. § 73-116.”   State v. Lawrence, 98 Idaho at1
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400, 565 P.2d at 990, citing, State v. Crouch, 407 P.2d 671, 673 (N.M. 1965) (“[T]he
common law gave trial courts the discretion to make sentences consecutive or
concurrent.”) and State v. Jones, 440 P.2d 371, 372 (Or. 1968) (“It is an inherent
power of the court to impose sentences, including the choice of concurrent or
consecutive terms when the occasion demands it.”); see also, State v. Clapper, 143
Idaho 338, 341, 144 P.3d 43, 46 (Ct. App. 2006) (“Under the common law, the courts
in Idaho have discretionary power to impose cumulative sentences.”); State v.
Calley, 140 Idaho 663, 665, 99 P.3d 616, 618 (2004) (acknowledging common law
authority to impose either concurrent or consecutive sentence.)  In fact, “the
primary effect of [I.C. § 18-308 is] essentially to reinstate the common law rule[.]”
State v. Lawrence, 98 Idaho at 401, 565 P.2d at 991.
The common law authority to impose concurrent fines is not diminished by
I.C. § 37-2732B(a)(8).  While that statute requires the sentencing court to impose a
mandatory minimum fine for each conviction, there is nothing in the text
prohibiting the court from running multiple fines concurrently.  Thus, the
sentencing court had the authority at common law to impose either concurrent or
consecutive sentences, including any fines imposed, even though the statute
prohibited the court from suspending, deferring, or withholding the sentences.
The sentencing court’s decision cannot be upheld because it failed to correctly
perceive the issue as discretionary and it did not act consistently with the applicable
legal standards.  Cummings v. Stephens, 2016 WL 4734857, at *2.  And as it
appears that the court would have imposed concurrent fines had it believed it had
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the authority to do so, this Court should vacate the imposition of the fines and
remand for further proceedings.   
V.  CONCLUSION  
For the reasons set forth above, Ms. Lemmons respectfully requests that the
Court remand both the 2011 case (No. 436720) and the 2012 case (No. 43721) with
instructions that the district court exercise its discretion and consider whether to
run the fines concurrently.
Respectfully submitted this 14  day of September, 2016.th
 /s/Dennis Benjamin                     
Dennis Benjamin 
Attorney for Bryann Lemmons 
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